Commitment mapper
The commitment mapper is an off-chain trusted service provided by Sismo. It is immutable in an isolated infrastructure.
It enables account owners to convert a proof of account ownership into a proof of secret knowledge.
The account owner receives a receipt from the Commitment Mapper, which maps their account with their commitment (e.g hash of their secret).
The combination of the user's secret and the commitment mapper receipt form the Delegated Proof Of Ownership.
The commitment can be used in ZK systems as an account nullifier

How it works

Users submit a proof of account ownership (e.g ECDSA signature from a wallet for an Ethereum account or OAuth verification for a twitter account) to the commitment mapper alongside a commitment (e.g hash of a secret only they know or the EdDSA public key of an account of theirs).
The commitment mapper will verify the validity of the account ownership proof and register the commitment for this account in a mapping stored on a database.
If the account is already mapped with a commitment, the commitment mapper will return an error.
Next, the mapper will send a signed commitment receipt to the user, which guarantees that they went through the commitment scheme.
A commitment receipt can be retrieved at any time by the account owner by sending a new proof of ownership.
Example: Hydra Delegated Proof of Ownership via Commitment Mapper which uses Poseidon hash function and EdDSA digital signature schemes which are SNARK-friendly
For an Ethereum account and a secret commitment:
  • The owner of 0x123..def will sign a message to prove ownership of the account
  • They will send the signature along with its commitment = poseidonHash(secret)
  • The commitment mapper will verify the signature and then register the following key: value
    • key: 0x123...def
    • value: commitment = poseidonHash(secret)
  • The commitment mapper will sign (with its EdDSA private key) the following receipt: (poseidonHash(0x123...def, poseidonHash(secret))
Note: The user will be able to use this receipt to prove in a SNARK that:
  1. 1.
    They know the secret (they generate poseidonHash(secret) in the SNARK)
  2. 2.
    They went through the commitment mapper (verify the commitment mapper EdDSA signature in the SNARK)
  3. 3.
    Their commitment mapper was linked (verify the receipt construction in the SNARK)


Proving the ownership of an Ethereum account to a third party is generally simple via a message signature. Similarly, one can easily prove ownership of a github or twitter account via OAuth.
However, in constrained environments like ZK-SNARKs circuits, those proofs of ownership become impractically expensive.
For instance, the ECDSA signature of Ethereum accounts are very expensive to prove inside a SNARK. By using a Commitment Mapper signing received with an EdDSA address (cheap to prove and verify in a SNARK), Sismo alleviates this problem.
Also, the ECDSA signature cannot be used as a nullifier because it is malleable (several different valid signatures can be created using ECDSA). By enforcing a single commitment for an Ethereum account, the secret (only known to the user) that generated the commitment can be used as a nullifier.

Proof of Ownership Independence

It is interesting to note that compared to semaphore which also uses commitments, the commitment mapper only verifies proofs of ownership.
This means that a Delegated Proof of Ownership can be reused in any system.
For instance, in Sismo Hydra-S1 Attesters, the same commitment can be used to prove group membership in any group of accounts.
The group data (e.g the list of accounts) is independent from the proof of ownership.

Off-chain Commitments

By keeping the mapping off-chain, the Commitment Mapper ensures that the set of all the accounts that interacted with it (called the Anonymity Set) remains private.
Other projects such as semaphore or tornado cash use the same kind of commitments (though they link the data to it) but they do it publicly, creating anonymity sets.
There is a path to more openness on our side: once the anonymity set is big enough, we will be able to publish our exact data.
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How it works